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Philosophical Parrêsia and Transpolitical Freedom  
Ottavio Marzocca, Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro” 
 
ABSTRACT: This article highlights that ancient philosophy regenerated the practice of par-
rêsia following the crisis into which it had fallen in the polis.  Through this, it established a 
strong relationship between freedom, truth, and politics, constantly eluding the risk of using 
“true speech” as a tool of rationalizing the exercise of power.  The primary outset for the ar-
gument will be the course held by Foucault in 1982-1983 (Le gouvernement de soi et des autres).  
The paper holds that philosophical parrêsia asserted itself as a practice that could not be any-
thing but “transpolitical,” while remaining similar to the ideal of freedom as active participa-
tion in public life—at least in the case of Socrates and the Cynics.  According to Foucault, after 
a long period of disuse due to the predominance of theology and pastoral power, philosophical 
parrêsia was able to flourish in modernity.  This occurred above all with Kant through the criti-
cal ontology of the present.  On my part, I try to show how philosophical parrêsia in liberal soci-
ety runs the risk of being neutralized by the predominance of economic “true speech” and by 
the prevalence of the idea of freedom as the pursuit of private interests.  This is done by re-
reading certain indications provided by Foucault himself in his course of 1978-1979 (Naissance 
de la biopolitique).  Moreover, in the last sections of this paper I suggest lines of research that 
could grasp the difficulties that philosophical parrêsia encounters in the age of neoliberal he-
gemony and global media coverage.1 
 
Keywords: Truth, government, freedom, civic virtue, economic discourse.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This text is an expanded version of a paper I presented at the conference on the topic “Il governo di sé, il 
governo degli altri,” organized by the Università degli Studi di Palermo (Italy), at the Centre Culturel 
Français de Palerme et de Sicile, on 20-21 May 2010. 
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Eh bien, à une époque, la notre, où on aime tant poser les problèmes de la démocratie en termes de 
distribution du pouvoir, d’autonomie de chacun dans l’exercice du pouvoir, en termes de transparence et 
d’opacité, de rapports entre société civile et État, je crois qu’il est peut-être bon de rappeler cette vieille 
question, qui a été contemporaine du fonctionnement même de la démocratie athénienne et de ses crises, à 
savoir la question du discours vrai et de la césure nécessaire, indispensable et fragile que le discours vrai 
ne peut pas ne pas introduire dans une démocratie, une démocratie qui à la fois rend possible ce discours 
vrai et le menace sans cesse.2 
 
I 
 
1. Frankness of Speech, Freedom, Government 
In reconstructing the history of parrêsia, Michel Foucault identified the first political conditions 
decidedly in favor of courageous freedom of speech in Greek democracy.  The main form in 
which it was expressed was the political parrêsia of the citizen.  He spoke freely before the as-
sembly, attempting not only to practice his equal right of expression, but also to say with frank-
ness what he thought were the decisions to be made for the government of the polis, no matter 
how bitter or difficult.  On the one hand, his frankness rendered his words credible and al-
lowed him to optimize influence over fellow citizens.  On the other, it exposed him to the risk 
of going against common opinion and urging the city to make opportune, but dangerous deci-
sions, for which he would be solely responsible in case of failure.3 
The democratic freedom to participate in political life and to speak publicly (isonomia 
and isêgoria), created the conditions in which parrêsia could be fully expressed.  However,   
these freedoms could also cause the attrition of democracy if citizens shirked the moral com-
mitment to make a truly parrhesiastic use of freedom of speech and instead abused it.  This 
would involve lapsing into demagogic adulation of the people or rhetoric competition to win 
the favor of the city and rise in the hierarchy of power.  Michel Foucault shows us—above all 
through Isocrates and Plato—how this distortion of ‘free-spookenness’ contributed to a crisis 
for democracy and the polis itself.4  It was due to this democratic mortification of parrêsia 
that—according to him—philosophy defined the parrhesiastic task that it ended up taking on. 
                                                 
2 “Well, in an age like ours, in which it is so popular to propose problems of democracy in terms of distribu-
tion of power, of each person’s autonomy in exercising power, in terms of transparency and opacity, and of 
the relationship between civil society and state, I believe it may be good to remember this old issue, which 
was contemporaneous with the very functioning of Athenian democracy and its crises.  That is, the issue of 
true discourse and the necessary, indispensable and fragile caesura that true discourse cannot not introduce 
into a democracy, a democracy that makes this true discourse possible and, at the same time, threatens it 
without pause.”  Michel Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres: Cours au Collège de France, 1982-1983, 
edited by Frédéric Gros (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2008), 168.  Hereafter texts by Michel Foucault are cited by 
their original editions in French.  Translation of the quotations will be provided in English in the footnotes or 
in parentheses in the text.               
3 Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 157-164.  In this regard, Foucault’s principal reference is the 
case of Pericles: see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Charles F. Smith, in Thucydi-
des in Four Volumes (London: William Heinemann Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press - Loeb 
Classical Library, 1928), vol. I, books I and II. 
4 See: Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 164-168 and 181-185; Isocrates, On the Peace, translated by 
George Norlin, in Isocrates in Three Volumes (London: William Heinemann Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
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The analysis that Foucault develops around this task is worthy of appreciation, both 
because parrêsia is presented as a necessary experience for philosophy itself, and because—in 
the forms that it assumes through philosophy—parrêsia also reveals itself as a special practice 
of freedom.  This freedom is indispensable for anyone who sees in the “government of men” a 
problem more than a need and, therefore, is not willing to let himself be governed in any way 
or at any price.5  However, the meaning of philosophical parrêsia in Foucault’s analysis makes 
it comparable with other practices of freedom that are particularly indocile toward “govern-
ment.”  One example is that of the modern “subject of interest,” which is theorized  by liberal-
ism.6  These are the main lines to be sought in this text.  Also, I will attempt to show how phil-
osophical parrêsia can become problematic in the context of liberal and neoliberal societies.  
However, this latter aim will be somewhat tentative. 
 
In Foucault’s analysis, parrêsia translates into a very precise kind of transpolitical freedom.  This 
is done—in reference to Socrates, Plato, and the Cynics—by its becoming a philosophical prac-
tice.  From the crisis of democracy and the diffidence toward other forms of government, phi-
losophy recognizes the need to regenerate the courage for truth and to reconnect it to politics, 
without reducing it to the immediate needs of exercising power.  Philosophical parrêsia must 
exist within the field of politics where it shakes it up, without trying to dictate the precise 
forms of rationality, to which governments must adhere.  Through it—observes Foucault—“la 
philosophie a à dire vrai (…), non pas sur le pouvoir, mais par rapport au pouvoir, en relation, 
dans une sorte de vis-à-vis avec lui ou d’intersection avec lui.”7 
Socrates was an exemplary case of the parrhesiast philosopher’s attitude toward poli-
tics.  He spoke the truth to his fellow citizens, showing them that they were not taking care of 
themselves and that, instead, they should do so to transform their way of being and acting.  
Not till then should they try their hand at politics or accept public office.  This would avoid 
abuse of office and allowing private ambitions to prevail over the good of the city.  The trans-
versal message that Socrates sends to politics is that it is not possible for a person to govern 
others if he has not yet tested his own status as a free man, verifying his ability not to be a 
slave to his own degenerate impulses.8   
                                                                                                                                                                  
University Press - Loeb Classical Library, 1929), vol. II, 2-97; Plato, The Republic, translated by Paul Shorey, in 
Plato in Twelve Volumes (London: William Heinemann Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press - 
Loeb Classical Library, 1935), vol. VI, 276-333.   
5 On these lines, see Michel Foucault, “Qu’est que la critique? (Critique et Aufklärung),” Bulletin de la Société 
Française de Philosophie, no.  2 (1990), 35-63.   
6 See Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978-1979, edited by Michel 
Senellart  (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004), lesson on 28 March 1979  
7 “…philosophy must speak the truth (…) not about power, but as related to power, in a sort of face to face 
relationship with it, or in intersection with it.” (Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 264) 
8  See Ibid., 222 and 299; see also : Michel Foucault, L’herméneutique du sujet: Cours au Collège de France, 1981-
1982, edited by Frédéric Gros (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2001), lessons held on 6 and 13 January 1982; Plato, 
Apology, translated by Harold N. Fowler, in Plato in Twelve Volumes (London: William Heinemann 
Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press - Loeb Classical Library, 1914) vol. I, 61-45; Plato, Alcibiades 
I, translated by Walter R. M. Lamb, in Plato in Twelve Volumes (London: William Heinemann Ltd/Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press - Loeb Classical Library, 1927), vol. XII, 93-223. 
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In Plato’s experience, the parrhesiastic relationship with politics is more direct, but re-
mains transverse.  He wants for philosophical discourse to be more than mere logos, but that it 
should translate into ergon, reality.  However, this does not mean that philosophy should be 
reduced to dictating the laws of the State.  Certainly, the prevailing interpretation of Plato’s 
thought links him closely to a nomothetic aspiration, to the ambition—expressed in works like 
The Republic and The Laws—of formulating laws and designing an ideal regime for the city.  
This being said, Foucault, emphasizing the stance revealed in Epistle VII, perceptively 
hypothesizes that “l’activité du nomothète qu’a l’air de se donner Platon dans Les Lois et dans 
La République,” is “un jeu comme l’est, bien que différemment bien sur, le mythe.”9  In fact, the 
clear refusal of writing as an appropriate practice for philosophy, expressed in Epistle VII (as 
well as in Phaedrus), leads Plato to say explicitly: “whenever one sees a man’s written composi-
tions—whether they be the laws of a legislator or anything else in any other form,—these are 
not his most serious works, if so be that the writer himself is serious: rather those works abide 
in the fairest region he possesses.”10  
Hence, the necessity to frame the parrhesiastic relationship between philosophy and 
politics in a much more complex way, as delineated by Plato.  For him, philosophy must ad-
dress politics only if it is certain to be listened to.  It is not a question of grabbing attention arti-
ficially, as in rhetorical speech.  Rather, it is necessary to enter into a relationship with politics, 
asking it to put itself to the philosophical test.  What Plato hoped for may seem to be a ‘role 
reversal.’  However, it does not imply transforming the philosopher into a governor,—rather 
the reverse is the case.  In going to Syracuse, for instance, he sought to test the apparent will-
ingness of Dionysius the Younger to make philosophy his way of life.  If he had chosen philos-
ophy as his way of life, the ruler would certainly not have had to limit himself to acquiring a 
predetermined body of knowledge through the assimilation of formulas.11  Instead, he could 
have dedicated himself—under the guidance of a teacher—to a philosophical practice consist-
ing in exercise and effort.  This would have provided him with a special capacity to learn, 
memorize, and reason, thus allowing him to span the current modes of knowledge so as to 
transcend them in the intellectual intuition of what is real.12  The acceptance of philosophy as a 
way of life consists in the choice of “une route à parcourir” (“a road to be traveled”), in which 
one merges with philosophy and translates it into a relationship with oneself.  It is along this 
path that the “gouvernement de soi” (“government of self”) can correctly take shape and, in 
turn, legitimately develop into the “gouvernement des autres” (“government of others”).13  As 
                                                 
9 “…the activity of the nomothete, which Plato seems to want to assign himself in The Laws and The Repub-
lic…“, …is “a game such as the myth [is a game], although certainly in a different way.”  (Foucault, Le 
gouvernement de soi et des autres, 234)  See also ibid., 233-236. 
10 Plato, Epistle VII, translated by Robert G. Bury, in Plato in Twelve Volumes (London: William Heinemann 
Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press - Loeb Classical Library, 1929), vol. IX, 541. 
11 See Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 228-230. 
12 See ibid., 230-233. 
13  Ibid., 221 and 236. 
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Foucault observes, “il faut que l’âme du Prince puisse se gouverner vraiment selon la 
philosophie vraie, pour pouvoir gouverner les autres selon une politique juste.”14  
For both Socrates and Plato, the transversality of philosophical parrêsia with regards to 
politics is seen in that it works according to motivations that are both philosophical-political 
and philosophical-moral.  Through parrhesiastic commitment, philosophy certainly asks a 
political question: how to make space for the ‘true speech’ in the problematic space of politics? 
This way of asking this question is necessarily made by way of an ethical question, which is 
both internal and external to politics: how to see that those who govern, govern themselves 
well, above all, starting from the ‘true speech’ addressed to them?15 
Ultimately, the relationship between philosophy and politics takes place through a tri-
angulation between politics, ‘true speech,’ and freedom, or better, between critical attention to 
exercise of power, elaboration of knowledge, and formation of ethos.  This is what Foucault 
wants to tell us when—through reading Epistles VII and VIII, Phaedrus and Gorgias—he sheds 
light on three fundamental aspects of the parrhesiastic function of philosophy. 
1) This function primarily takes place through the relationship that philosophical 
parrêsia has with power, articulating it in “une certaine façon non politique de parler à ceux 
qui gouvernent, et de [leur] parler à propos de la manière dont ils doivent gouverner les 
autres” and, above all, “dont ils doivent se gouverner eux-mêmes.”16 
2) Additionally, this function is carried out through the same commitment of the 
parrhesiastic philosopher to truth, which is not so much to indicate that which is true with 
certainty, as much as to come closer to the truth through a dialectical path shared with an 
interlocutor.  In any case this implies the decided refusal of rhetoric: it is rhetoric that shirks all 
commitment to truth, tending to favor persuasion exclusively.17 
3) Finally, the parrhesiastic function of philosophy takes place through the 
solicitation of the soul or ethos of the person it refers to—citizen, governor or disciple—so that 
he can become a subject capable of governing himself or—if you prefer—of being truly worthy 
of the liberty he has.  From this last point of view, parrêsia is expressed as psychagogy, as 
pedagogy, and in general, as an invitation to the transformation or the ascetic constitution of one’s 
own subjectivity.18 
 
 
                                                 
14 “…the soul of the Prince must seriously govern itself in conformity with true philosophy to be able to gov-
ern others in conformity with fair politics.” (Ibid., 272)  On this argument see Plato, Epistle VII, 477-565. 
15 See Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres,  279. 
16 “…a certain unpolitical way of speaking to those who govern, and to speak to them about the way in 
which they should govern others” and, above all, “in which they must govern themselves.” (Foucault, Le 
gouvernement de soi et des autres,  323)  See Plato, Epistle VII and Epistle VIII, translated by Robert G. Bury, in 
Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. IX, 477-589. 
17 See: Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 324; Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Harold North Fowler, 
in Plato in Twelve Volumes (London: William Heinemann Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press - 
Loeb Classical Library, 1914) vol. I, 405-576. 
18 See: Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 324-325; Plato, Gorgias, translated by Walter R. M. Lamb, 
in Plato in Twelve Volumes (London: William Heinemann Ltd/Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press - 
Loeb Classical Library, 1925), vol. III, 247-533. 
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2. An Apparent Lack of Commitment 
The transversality of philosophical parrêsia with regards to politics is also expressed in another 
apparently banal, but meaningful, way.  The disenchantment that the crisis in the polis in-
duced in Socrates and Plato, pushed philosophy to carry out its parrhesiastic role with all 
forms of government.  As Foucault observes, whether it is a democracy, an oligarchy, or a 
monarchy, “la politique […] a besoin de cette parrêsia,”19 according to the ancient philosophers.  
This explains Plato’s willingness to take the occasion offered to him, at least in appearance, at 
Syracuse to carry out the role of direct counselor to the monarch.  The philosopher had experi-
enced both democracy and oligarchy and had no proof that one was less disposed to injustices 
than the other.  Socrates gives witness to this.20  
Nevertheless, in the Apology it is Socrates himself who explains his apparent lack of 
commitment to politics, highlighting the degeneration of democracy, which does not allow 
anyone who wants to commit to truth to play any role in the institutions.  Furthermore, he 
remembers that he did not shirk the duties that both the oligarchic and the democratic gov-
ernments assigned to him, but rather that he in both cases avoided orders to commit injustice 
in carrying them out.  Therefore, Socrates found the reason for asserting the difference be-
tween philosophical and political ways of being in the deterioration of politics.  However, by 
refusing to commit an injustice in carrying out his duties, he took the opportunity to act in a 
fair way, to bear witness to his commitment to the truth vis-a-vis politics, working within the 
system and stepping outside of it to regain his ethical freedom.  Not that this was any less po-
litical.21  
What can be said then, of that other philosophical manner of political participation that 
marked the experience of the Cynics?  Regarding this, Foucault’s acumen allows us to under-
stand a few truly essential elements.  The resistance that Socrates and Plato tried to offer to the 
task of simply telling rulers what they should do in the exercise of power, is translated by the 
Cynics into a relationship of conflict, of “défi-dérision” (“defiance-derision”) with authorities.  
It is pointless to point out, once again, the proverbial encounters between Diogenes and Philip 
or Alexander.  Rather, it is interesting to note something else: while the polis began its decline 
and the Macedonian monarchy announced the victory of the empire over the urban context of 
politics, the Cynics established their parrhesiastic way of living and expressing themselves in 
the city’s public squares, in that political space par excellence that politics itself was abandon-
ing or was reducing to the position of a pure exhibition of sovereign power.22  The figure of the 
Cynical philosopher—throughout the history of imperial Rome as well—reanimated the site of 
politics, which had been debased and mortified by the monarchies, with its own scandalous 
and mocking way of being and of talking to all men, “not about revenues, or income, or peace, 
or war, but about happiness and unhappiness, about success and failure, about slavery and 
                                                 
19 “…politics […] needs this parrêsia.” (Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 277) 
20 See Ibid., 198-199. 
21 See Ibid., 290-295. 
22 Ibid.  269.   
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freedom”: “are you looking for any nobler politics than that in which he is engaged?” asks 
Epictetus, drawing a portrait of this philosopher.23 
Vice versa, Plato did not look to the square, but to the soul of the Prince (the ruler of 
Syracuse) for the place in which philosophy could have proof of its truth, while Socrates 
searched for it in the lifestyle of the citizens of Athens without neglecting to interpellate them 
on the street. 
It is possible to perceive the twofold declination of the philosophical parrêsia that Fou-
cault began to bring forth in his course in 1982-1983 in these differences.  Indeed, they were 
clearly highlighted in his course in 1984: on the one hand, the Platonic tendency to search for 
the truths that must inspire he who is destined to govern and who must, primarily, govern 
himself well if he wishes to govern others correctly,  in the supersensitive world of the soul 
and ideas; on the other, the Socratic, and above all Cynical, tendency to favor the immediate 
form of existence for self and others, as a terrain on which to recognize and show, with one’s 
own example, the uncomfortable truths that should be told to those who govern and those 
who are governed.24   
From this point of view, it can be said that Platonic parrêsia leads philosophy to the ex-
treme consequence of distrusting the citizens of the polis, and to directly address he who gov-
erns as a sovereign, running the risk, however, that the philosopher be transformed into a doc-
ile sycophant of the Prince.25  Instead, Socratic-Cynical parrêsia remains close to the practice of 
active citizenship.  It continues to demonstrate through the course of antiquity both the need 
for citizen participation in public life and the degenerating risks this participation runs.  This 
parrêsia will remind citizens of the need to distinguish clearly between political participation 
and the exercise of power as an end in itself and the pursuit of its privileges.  This is done by 
the critical distance of Socrates toward politics and by his exhortation to his fellow citizens, 
made in the centre of the city, to be concerned with themselves rather than with honors, 
wealth, or glory.26  This is done also, and even more, by the disrespectful stance of the Cynics 
toward the powerful and by his poverty publically flaunted and actively practiced so as to 
remain free from even the power of need.27 
 
3. Eclipse 
In his reconstruction, Foucault highlights the long eclipse of philosophical parrêsia caused by 
Christianity, explaining it with the theological defusing of philosophy and the reabsorption of 
the parrhesiastic commitment in the mechanisms of pastoral power.  The triangulation be-
tween politics, truth, and ethos, through which philosophy played its parrhesiastic game, was 
                                                 
23 Epictetus, Arrian’s Discourses, in Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, The Manual, and Fragments 
in Two Volumes, translated by William A. Oldfather (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press/London: 
William Heinemann Ltd - Loeb Classical Library, 1928), 161.  See Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 
320. 
24 See in particular Michel Foucault, Le courage de la vérité. Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II: Cours au 
Collège de France. 1984, edited by Frédéric Gros (Paris: Gallimard-Seuil, 2009), 144-161. 
25 On these lines see Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 269-270. 
26 Ibid., 299.   
27  See  Foucault, Le courage de la vérité, 236-245 ; see also Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 319. 
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moved to a territory where it was those who governed, meaning the pastoral authorities, who 
wanted to guide men’s souls in the name of a truth that was revealed or to be revealed, invit-
ing them to renounce the world to gain salvation in the afterlife.28 
According to Foucault, philosophical parrêsia can only re-emerge in modernity, when 
philosophy is be able to re-establish a transversal relationship, “d’extériorité et de corrélation” 
(“of exteriority and correlation”), with the government of men.  This will happen when phi-
losophy, freeing itself from theology, subtracts the interaction between attention to the exer-
cise of power, ‘true speech’ and the moral engagement of the subject from the control of au-
thorities (religious or political).  In this way the interaction between power, knowledge, and 
ethos can revert to being an interaction between politics, truth and freedom.  Modern philoso-
phy will be successful in this effort: 1) when it is capable of posing problems to politics, with-
out the pretension of saying “ce qu’il faut faire (…) et comme il faut gouverner” (“what should 
be done (…) and how to govern”), and is able to remain aloof from the wielding of power; 2) 
when it does not purport to establish truth in an incontrovertible way and be its custodian, but 
engages in critique of illusions and deceits held by those who govern; 3) when, giving up the 
promise to disalienate the subject at an undetermined future time, it shows that (for a man 
who would be free here and now) it is necessary and possible to practice freedom, trying to 
transform himself and reducing in this way his dependence on power.29 
This is the meaning that must be given to Foucault’s intense reference to the Kantian 
questions on the Enlightenment and the Revolution, made at the opening of his course in 1982-
1983.  For him, these questions were an inaugural act for a philosophy, seen as a critical ontolo-
gy of the present, which finds its original inspirations in the philosophical parrêsia of the an-
cients.30  Nevertheless, these questions are also contemporary to the historical moment in 
which the art of governing men reached a historically unprecedented political scale and au-
tonomy by the apparatuses and knowledge that absolutism had been able to develop around 
the body of society through the police state.31   This being said, we are also at a turning point, 
the beginning of a new stage in history.  There were pressing new problems of truth and free-
dom, which—according to Foucault—philosophy began to address in regaining its parrhes-
iastic commitment. 
 
 
                                                 
28 See ibid., 320-321.  With regards to this, see above all Michel Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours 
au Collège de France, 1977-1978, edited by Michel Senellart (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004), especially the les-
sons from 8 February to 1 March 1978.  Also of particular importance in this regard is Michel Foucault, Du 
gouvernement des vivants: Cours au Collège de France, 1979-1980, edited by Michel Senellart (Paris: Gallimard/ 
Seuil, 2012).  
29 Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 321-327. 
30 See: ibid., 8-38 e 322; Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?,” (1784), in Kant’s 
Werke (Berlin-Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1923), vol. VIII, 33-42; Immanuel Kant, “Der Streit der Fakul-
täten. Zweiter Abschnitt. Der Streit der philosophischen Fakultät mit der juristischen. Erneuerte Frage: Ob 
das menschliche Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum besseren sei,” (1798), in Kant’s Werke, vol.  
VII, 79-94. 
31 See Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population, lessons on 29 March and 5 April 1978. 
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II 
 
4. Questions 
Taking these indications from Foucault, it seems appropriate to pose a few questions, directing 
our attention to modernity and the present:  1) what are the hidden dangers that philosophical 
parrêsia encounters along its path in modernity?  2) What happens to this practice of freedom 
when other kinds of freedom also move in and out of the sphere of politics, trying to elude not 
only the exercise of power, but also a commitment to the ‘common good’?  3) Finally, what 
happens to the courage for truth in a time like the present, when the media coverage of public 
debate has expanded the freedom “to say what you want” out of all proportion without com-
mitting to the search for truth that counters the dominating rationality of the government of 
men? 
It is difficult to give immediate and satisfying answers to these questions, but an at-
tempt should be made. 
A possible answer to the first question (what are the hidden dangers of modernity for 
philosophical parrêsia?) is suggested by Foucault himself when he points out the modern incli-
nation to conceive of philosophy “comme objet scolaire ou universitaire” (“as a scholastic or 
university subject”),32 or better as technical and doctrinaire knowledge only to be taught, 
without taking any ethical-political risks.  In this regard, he says : “tout le monde sait, et moi le 
premier, que nul n’a besoin d’être courageux pour enseigner.”33  Philosophical parrêsia can 
clearly only be compromised by this inclination, which leads the way in modern philosophy.  
However, we must be careful not to reduce the need to revitalize the ethical-political function 
of parrêsia in general to the need simply to save the parrhesiastic duty of philosophy. Indeed, 
the public effectiveness of courage for truth in our age could be neutralized by new ways of 
conceiving of the relationship between truth, power, and freedom, notwithstanding the chanc-
es that philosophy can offer it.  This also involves responding to the second question: what 
happens to the courageous freedom of philosophical parrêsia when it encounters the prolifera-
tion of other forms of transpolitical freedom? 
 
5. Modernity of the Ancients? 
In this regard, it seems appropriate to refer to the genealogy of liberal society.  Once again, 
Foucault lends a hand in one of his courses: the one held in 1978-1979 at the Collège de 
France.34  However, one should also consider the studies of John G. A.  Pocock, Antonio Negri, 
and Quentin Skinner, who examined the reappearance of the ethical-political ideals from an-
tiquity in early modernity, before liberal culture had been asserted definitively.35 
                                                 
32 Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, 318.   
33 “everyone knows, myself first of all, that no one needs to be courageous to teach.” (Foucault, Le courage de 
la vérité, 24)  On the difference that exists on this point between modern and ancient philosophy, see: Pierre 
Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), and Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et 
philosophie antique (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 2001). 
34 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique 
35 John G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton UK: Princeton University Press, 1975); Antonio Negri, Il potere costituente: Saggio sulle alternative 
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In Anglo-Saxon and, in particular, in English culture, which Foucault identified as the 
‘cradle’ of the most efficient and resistant liberal governmentality,36 the classical models of 
citizen freedom in the polis and res publica became fundamental points of reference for the po-
litical confrontation of the 17th and 18th centuries.  The ideal, in the name of which these 
models were recovered through the filter of Renaissance, civic humanism, was that of “re-
sponsible political participation and civic virtue.”37  A vast movement to protest absolutism 
was created, which—with various accentuations or mitigations—saw the Republican regime 
as the form of government that the English system should emulate.38  
Absolutism was not the only object of protest for this movement however.  Its real tar-
get was the “corruption” that—according to its exponents—derived from the pressing devel-
opments of the “commercial society,” in which the budding liberal culture found a favorable 
environment.  According to the neo-classical vision of the English republicans, the civic and 
virtuous liberty of the citizens of Athens and Rome began its decline when free men started 
devoting themselves to commercial activities, abandoning the possibility to guarantee their 
independence through the stable ownership of land.  This had been a necessary condition for 
free and direct participation in public life, which in turn had allowed them to ward off or con-
tain the dangers of despotism.39  
This vision of freedom vied against the budding liberal culture for almost two centu-
ries, seeking a way to regenerate the virtues of the ancients, even when the rise of the “com-
mercial society” seemed irreversible.  In general, it can be said that this confrontation between 
Republicanism and Liberalism took place largely between two contrasting forms of freedom: 
on the one hand, there was the ideal of virtuous and civic, ethic and political, freedom, that is 
the freedom that Socrates, Plato, and Diogenes had seen enter into crisis before their eyes and 
had decided to keep alive through the use of philosophical parrêsia toward politics; on the  
other hand, loomed a vision, which led the free man to act in his private interests and for his 
passions, and which impressed upon freedom a transpolitical impetus in a very different 
manner from that which can be attributed to philosophical parrêsia.40   
                                                                                                                                                                  
del moderno (Milano: SugarCo Edizioni, 1992), chap. III; Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
36 See Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, lesson on 17 January 1979. 
37 John G. A. Pocock, “Introduzione all’edizione italiana” in John G. A. Pockock, Il momento machiavelliano: Il 
pensiero politico fiorentino e la tradizione repubblicana anglosassone, translated by Alfonso Prandi (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 1980), 46. 
38 As is well-known, the main representative of this movement—developed over a period of almost two cen-
turies—was James Harrington, author of The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), the most well-known edition of 
which historically is the one included in: The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, with an Account of 
His Life by John Toland (London: Becket and Cadell, 1771).  The figure of Harrington was so important as to 
make it possible to distinguish between a Harringtonian and a neo-Harringtonian phase of Republicanism at 
that time.  However, many other names can be mentioned, including John Milton, Henry Neville, Marcha-
mont Nedham, John Trenchard, John Toland, Andrew Fletcher, etc..  In this regard, see above all the texts 
previously mentioned by Pocock and Skinner. 
39 See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 386-393, and  Negri, Il potere costituente, 131-144. 
40 On the contrast that took shape in the 17th and 18th centuries between the concept of ‘virtuous and civic 
freedom’ of classic inspiration and that of ‘economic and private freedom’ of proto-liberal inspiration, a 
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Certainly, the first of these two visions corresponded to freedom interpreted as the op-
posite of slavery,41 and the second to a freedom that was increasingly thought of—from William 
Paley to Isaiah Berlin, and including Benjamin Constant42—as a negative freedom, as the absence 
of impediments: on the one hand, the desire not to be subjugated, which requires participation in 
the government and the capacity to govern oneself; on the other hand, the desire not to be ham-
pered, which requires, above all, that governments not govern too much and let the governed 
freely see to their interests. 
A result of the affirmation of the liberal vision is, obviously, the privatization of the free-
dom of the individual, which is also proof of the difficulty of “capitalist thought” to truly con-
ceive of modern man as the subject of active political participation.43  This does not mean, 
however, that the ‘private individual’ of liberal society is destined to remain indifferent to the 
political sphere.  Exactly because his interests drive him, he recognizes that the political pro-
tection of everyone’s interests can also be the best way to guarantee the greatest satisfaction of 
his own interests.  Governments that follow this line are the best: the individual in a liberal soci-
ety turns his attention to their exercise of power to make sure that they limit themselves to its 
fulfillment.  In this way, the freedom of the liberal individual is a sort of transpolitical free-
dom: he is certainly interested in public power, but not to affirm his own political role, but 
rather to ask power itself to interfere as little as possible in his autonomy which passes 
through the public space, but does not favor it as the place of its fulfillment.   
 
6. The Economic Truth of Freedom  
In his 1978-1979 course, Foucault offers elements that are important for grasping the 
transpolitical character of liberal freedom, and for understanding how it is articulated through 
a triangulation between problems of government, of ‘true speech’ and of freedom itself, which 
resembles the triangulation practiced by philosophical parrêsia, but which radically changes 
both its meaning and purposes. 
Regarding this issue, the Foucaultian description of the way in which liberalism defines 
and problematizes the theme of public power is a particularly useful reading: liberalism—
according to Foucault—sets itself forward as a specific government rationality which, because of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
comparison between Foucault and Pocock is proposed in: Graham Burchell, “Peculiar Interest: Civil Society 
and Governing ‘The System of Natural Liberty’,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller (eds.), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 121-125; Colin 
Gordon, “Foucault in Britain,” in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas Rose (eds.), Foucault and Politi-
cal Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationality of Government (London-New York: Routledge, 1996), 255-
258. 
41 See Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 36-57, 66-77.  Useful indications on a similar characterization of the 
‘freedom of the ancients’ are proposed by Mario Vegetti in “L’ermeneutica del soggetto: Foucault, gli antichi 
e noi,” in Mario Galzigna (ed.), Foucault, oggi (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2008), 158-159. 
42 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy  (London: Faulder, 1785); Benjamin Constant, 
“De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes,” in Benjamin Constant, Collection complète des 
ouvrages publiés sur le Gouvernement représentatif et la Constitution actuelle de la France, formant une espèce de 
Cours de politique constitutionnelle (Paris: Plancher, 1819-1820), vol. 4, 238-274; Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on 
Liberty (London-New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
43 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 461. 
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its attention to freedom, distinguishes itself from the interventionism of the ancien régime.  Al-
so, it is a permanent attitude to government criticism, due to the inclination of each government to 
govern without limits.  In the first place, therefore, according to Foucault,  
 
le libéralisme est à analyser (…) comme principe et méthode de rationalisation de l’exercice 
du gouvernement—rationalisation qui obéit (…) à la règle interne de l’économie maximale.  
(…) la rationalisation libérale part du postulat que le gouvernement (…) ne saurait être, à 
lui-même, sa propre fin.  Il n’a pas en soi sa raison d’être, et sa maximalisation, fût-ce aux 
meilleures conditions possible, n’a pas à être son principe régulateur.44 
 
In the second place, exactly because it is permeated with the “soupçon qu’on risque toujours 
de trop gouverner” (“suspicion that there is always the risk of too much governing”), liberal-
ism acts to ensure that the power of government is not exercised “sans une ‘critique,’ 
autrement plus radicale qu’une épreuve d’optimisation.” (“without ‘criticism,’ much more 
radical than a test of optimization.”)  From this point of view, the government “ne doit pas 
s’interroger seulement sur les meilleurs moyens d’atteindre ses effets—ou sur les moins 
coûteux—, mais sur la possibilité et la légitimité même de son projet d’atteindre des effets.”45 
This fluctuation between ‘frugal government’ and criticism of government is the way in 
which liberalism plays the problematic game of balancing the exercise of power and freedom: it is 
a game that finds in political economy the true speech, which both those who govern and those who 
are governed must abide by.  This speech identifies the free market as the place and the mecha-
nism for establishing its truth.  The naturalization of the market and the attribution of a spon-
taneous nature to its functioning are the basis for the truth that the economic discourse stakes 
claim to with the political power to remind it of the respect for individual freedom which will 
itself have, therefore, a kernel of inescapable ‘economic truth.’  Then, as government rationality, 
liberalism cannot prescind from the guarantee or promotion of the economic freedoms of the 
governed and, for this reason, must set limits for itself.  On the other hand, as a political culture, 
which observes and criticizes the government from the point of view of those who are governed, 
liberalism is always ready to denounce the inclinations of public power toward abuse or ex-
cessive intervention in the market. 
In its classic form, the truth of the liberal economic discourse is able to assert itself, 
making a persuasive case for the idea that the play between supply and demand ‘naturally’ 
leads to the creation of prices appropriate to the relationship between production costs, needs 
and product availability.  In this way—says Foucault—the smooth functioning of the free 
market becomes “un étalon de vérité qui va permettre de discerner dans les pratiques 
                                                 
44 “liberalism should be (…) analyzed as a principle and method of rationalization of the exercise of govern-
ment—a rationalization that obeys (…) the internal rule of maximum economy. (…) liberal rationalization 
starts from the postulate by which the government (…) can not be an end in and of itself.  A government 
does not contain within itself its raison d’être and, even in the best possible conditions, its maximization must 
not be its regulating principle.” (Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, 323-324) 
45 “it must not wonder only about the best tools—or the least expensive ones—to achieve its results, but also 
about the possibility and even the legitimacy of its plan to achieve these results.” (Ibid., 324) 
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gouvernementales celles qui sont correctes et celles qui sont erronées.”46  With neo-liberalism, 
the naturalistic ingenuity of classical liberalism is mitigated and remodeled in a discourse that 
does not simply insist on the necessity of safeguarding the free exchange, but, above all, on the 
duty of the government to promote, on the one hand, competition as the “logique économique 
essentielle” (“essential economic logic”) of the market and, on the other hand, freedom of eco-
nomic initiative as a form of ethical responsibility of the individual.47  
In any case, this interaction between economic discourse, public power and liberty, 
adopting economic freedom as a model for and condition of all other freedoms, makes any 
discourse that claims to ‘speak the truth’ about government and liberty in terms irreducible to 
an economic logic incongruous and ineffective.  Therefore, in this framework, the public ‘true 
speech’, which addresses politics, seeks evermore seldom the validation of its effectiveness in 
the ‘civic virtue’ of those who govern or those who are governed.  This speech, rather, seeks 
this validation in the level of satisfaction of the interests of each and every one of us, which the 
government succeeds in guaranteeing by governing according to the economic logic of the 
market, i.e.  by governing, but not too much.48  
What remains to be proven is whether modern philosophy succeeds in passing through 
this scenario and pronouncing a different truth.  In addition, it must effectively contest this 
scenario through an ethos alternative to that of productivity and economic freedom.  Indeed, 
this is very difficult to be proven, especially if we pose the last question: what happens to the 
courage for truth when the ethical-political hegemony of economic freedom and the media 
coverage of the public debate reach current levels? 
 
III 
 
7. Shamelessness and Interests: A Hypothesis on Neoliberalism and Communication 
As can be imagined, the parrhesiastic commitment can only run up against further difficulties 
in media driven neo-liberal society.  In this society, the multiplication of public speaking op-
portunities clashes with the proliferation of possibilities to ‘say everything and the opposite of 
everything,’ which defeats any ethical commitment to say what one thinks and experiences as 
true.  Plato used similar terms to describe the decadence of democracy: the misuse of freedom 
leads men to legitimize any behavior, any speech and, in particular, to consider “insolence 
‘good breeding’“ and “shamelessness ‘manly spirit’.”49  From our point of view, we can evi-
dently identify in “shamelessness”—or the blatant practice of lying—the deliberate perversion 
of parrêsia.  I think this shamelessness is able to pass itself off as frankness and be taken for 
“manly spirit,” especially when the ‘private interest,’ rather than the ‘public virtue,’ becomes 
the core of the social ethos.   
                                                 
46 “a measure of truth that will make it possible to discern, between the practices of government, those which 
are just from those which are, instead, wrong.” (Ibid., 33)   
47 See Ibid., 122-125, 82-85. 
48 See Ibid., 275-285. 
49 Plato, The Republic, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. VI, 299. 
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In contemporary society this possibility is reinforced by the ambivalence in the idea of 
interests that liberalism assumes as the true substance of individual freedom.  Even the classic 
authors of liberalism maintain that the interests of the individual, although destined to pro-
duce benefits for the common good when combined with the interests of others, are constantly 
exposed to the risk of being misunderstood and poorly implemented in so far as they can be 
directly pursued to the detriment of the freedom and safety of others.50  This ambivalence ex-
poses the individual to suspicion of being ready to go beyond certain limits.  In the field of 
politics, this can lead to a profound and paradoxical transformation of the relationship be-
tween freedom of speech and commitment to truth. 
This is what can be seen today in the public debate of ‘advanced democracies’ such as 
Italy: it is assumed that there is bad faith, impropriety, and low credibility among the interloc-
utors in all discussions.  It is presupposed that everyone speaks for selfish reasons or is biased 
and an insinuation to that effect is enough to delegitimize his speech.  As Franca D’Agostini 
asserts, “any truth appears to be contaminated from the beginning by a backdrop of prelimi-
nary suspicion.  Thus, the soundness of the arguments loses all importance: officially everyone 
is in the wrong, and anyone who is lucky enough not to be wrong for a moment, will be 
wrong sooner or later.”51 
Nevertheless, if this fragility of public truth was already an obvious fact in Athenian 
democracy, it is improbable that the solution to the problem today lies—as D’Agostini asserts 
—in re-establishing the Socratic-Platonic rules of good argumentation and dialectics in debate, 
returning them “to the hands of the public of electors.”52  Today, in fact, this possibility seems 
to become very problematic due to the ethical-political hegemony of neoliberalism and its spe-
cific declinations of freedom as the pursuit of an interest, rather as a civic virtue.  In this re-
gard, I will limit myself to the tools that Foucault himself offers us when he investigates the 
tendency of theoreticians of human capital to indefinitely extend the economic approach to the 
behavior of man.  He seems to consider the analytical effectiveness of this tendency as the 
proof of the radical influence that the neoliberal economic discourse today can succeed in hav-
ing both on the forms of freedom and on government practices.53  These scholars describe in-
dividuals as holders of a human capital, who invest in this capital itself through a wide variety 
of activities, including activities quite unrelated to economics: instruction, training, medical 
care, good habits, choice of partner, procreation, child-rearing, etc.  This tendency to extend 
the economic analysis indefinitely even leads these theorists to examine crime in economic 
                                                 
50 See the exemplary position of John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker & Son, 1859), chap. IV. 
51 Franca D’Agostini, Verità avvelenata. Buoni e cattivi argomenti nel dibattito pubblico (Torino: Bollati Bo-
ringhieri, 2010), 12.   
52 Ibid., 13-15. 
53 See Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, 225-275.  Worthy of particular note among the main authors refer-
enced by Foucault are: Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Refer-
ence to Education (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964; Chicago-London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1993, 3th edition); Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago-
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976); Theodor W.  Schultz, Investments in Human Capital: The Role 
of Education and of Research (New York: The Free Press, 1971); Jacob Mincer, Schooling, Experience and Earnings 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974). 
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terms: a person who decides to commit a crime is no more than an economic subject who ac-
cepts the risks of his decision, since he calculates that his benefits will be superior to those of 
other choices.54  In this way, these scholars do not so much demonstrate that human nature is 
essentially economic, but that the average individual of today’s society has deeply interiorized 
the ethos and the political rationality inspired by the ‘truths’ of the market economy.  There-
fore, Foucault goes so far as to say that, applying the economic approach to various spheres of 
individual behavior, human capital theorists do not limit themselves to an updated view of 
homo oeconomicus, but demonstrate that this figure no longer corresponds (and perhaps it nev-
er truly corresponded) to the representation offered to us by classical liberalism, indicating in 
its freedom “la plage inaccessible à toute action de gouvernement” (“the sphere inaccessible to 
any government action”): by now the average individual of the neoliberal societies, as the de-
finitive incarnation of the homo oeconomicus, is “celui qui est éminemment gouvernable” (“he 
who is eminently governable”), as long as he is governed according to the discourse and polit-
ical rationality corresponding to the purely mercantile game of interests.55     
When a description like this illustrates the increasing integration of freedom, truth, and 
politics into economics taking place in neoliberal societies, it becomes truly difficult to imagine 
that other truths will be heard.  In a situation like this, it will be increasingly difficult not to 
attribute the pursuit of personal interests (prestige, success, academic power, etc.) to those 
who advise their fellow citizens to behave ethically rather than focusing on wealth, or to those 
who denounce the deceptions of those who govern in the name of the market economy.  In 
such a context the practice of parrêsia risks being neutralized, especially if you consider the 
hypothesis that today’s hyper-coverage of public communication now makes it possible to 
defuse the influence of any speech, trivializing it, ‘commercializing’ it or simply suffocating it 
in the abundance and obsessive repetition of discourse that is more useful to man’s neoliberal 
government. 
This is a hypothesis that can be compared with an apparently radical analysis, which 
had already been proposed before Foucault turned his attention to liberalism and neoliberal-
ism: one in which the media can only dissolve the possibility to make effective reference to a 
real representation of truth.  As is known, Baudrillard achieved the foremost instance of such 
analysis with his insistence on the victory of the system of signs and simulation over the old 
productive order of the classical industrial era.  In our day and age, being constantly ‘antici-
pated’ by simulation, the ‘real world’ disappears or is revealed to be that which Nietzsche dis-
covered: nothing more than a variation on the theme of ‘appearances’ or ‘illusions’ in which 
man, time after time, wraps himself up, so as to hide the chaos of existence.56 
                                                 
54 See Gary S.  Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” in The Economic Approach to Human 
Behavior, 39-85. 
55 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, 274-275. 
56 By Jean Baudrillard see: Pour une critique de l’économie politique du signe (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), chap. IX; La 
société de consommation: Ses mythes ses structures (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), part III, chap. I; L’échange symbolique 
et la mort (Paris : Gallimard, 1976), chap. II; Le crime parfait (Paris: Galilée, 1995); also see Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Götzen-Dämmerung (1889): “Wie die ‘wahre Welt’ endlich zur Fabel wurde,” in Nietzsche Werke: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1969), vol. VI, 
t. 3, 74-75. 
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Another version of this type of discussion is that proposed by Paul Virilio with his un-
ceasing denouncement of the historically unprecedented speed of information and media im-
ages.  In his opinion the extreme acceleration of this process creates an unbridgeable detach-
ment of the immaterial sphere of telecommunications from the concrete time and space in 
which direct social relationships between people take place.  This is what determines the 
transpolitical nature of media communications.  The flow of information—increasingly swift 
and immaterial—passes through and exceeds the material contexts of politics over which the 
citizen used to have some control.  In this way, this flow renders reality—and, therefore, also 
the ‘truth’ of that which happens in these contexts—substantially irrelevant.57  
This type of analysis was already formulated in its essential terms at the time of Fou-
cault.  Therefore, it is disconcerting to note the Olympian indifference he had for it.  This     
appears even more enigmatic upon considering the debt that these discussions owe to the      
Nietzschean announcement of the victory of the ‘fable’ over the ‘real world,’ an announcement 
about which Foucault was anything but indifferent. 
A hypothesis can be made about this: what these discussions seem to remove them-
selves from in predicting the evaporation of truth or reality is the need to address the          
Nietzschean idea of the will to truth.58  This, instead, is the notion, which Foucault sets at the 
heart of his relationship with Nietzsche.  However that may be, the problem of the will to truth 
is what truly motivates Foucault’s ‘eternal return’ to the question of ‘true speech,’ which we 
can find both in his genealogy of knowledge-power and in his examination of parrêsia.59 
From this point of view, limiting oneself to proposing the media’s dissolution of ‘truth’ 
or ‘reality,’ leads one to undervalue another hypothesis, i.e. the possibility that there is an in-
crease in the ‘will to truth’ which is taking place ‘beyond true and false,’ making use of both 
communication systems and new and old techniques of persuasion, dissuasion and neutraliza-
tion of the ‘courage of truth.’ 
This is a hypothesis, which in truth can only be carefully examined by moving far away 
from the main topics of this paper.  Hence, it is only possible to propose a few provisional  
ideas here.  An interesting approach could find its point of departure in the research by Toby 
Miller on the deep crisis of citizenship that he believes is underway in the neoliberal society 
dominated by the media.  The author insists on a contemporary link between neoliberal poli-
cies, the media’s function as ‘incitement to consumption,’ and the quantitative and qualitative 
reduction of information regarding policy on military power, the increase of inequality in the 
                                                 
57 Among the numerous texts by Paul Virilio, see: Vitesse et politique (Paris: Galilée, 1977); L’espace critique 
(Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1984); Cybermonde, la politique du pire: Entretien avec Philippe Petit (Paris: Les 
éditions Textuel, 1996); La bombe informatique (Paris: Galilée, 1998). 
58 See in particular Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882): “Inwiefern auch wir noch fromm 
sind,” in Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Wal-
ter de Gruyter & Co., 1973), vol. V, t. II, 256-259. 
59 This is what Michel Foucault openly declares in “Structuralisme et poststructuralisme,” in Michel Fou-
cault, Dits et écrits, 1954-1988, vol. IV, 444-446.  This text was originally published as “Structuralism and Post-
structuralism,” interview with Gérard Raulet, Telos, vol. XVI, no. 55 (1983), 195-211.  Also see Michel 
Foucault, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire,” in Michel Foucault (ed.), Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires Françaises, 1971), 145-172, republished in  Dits et écrits, 1954-1988, vol. II, 136-156. 
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distribution of wealth, destabilization of job security for workers, degradation of the environ-
ment, etc.  According to Miller, television networks play a fundamental role in this phenome-
non, by reinforcing the social importance of the consumer.  In this way, they reduce the subjec-
tivity of contemporary man to that of an individual primarily attentive to the choices to be 
made in the marketplace, weakening his willingness to participate actively in public life and 
reducing his ability for critical intervention in the dominating political and economic practic-
es.60 
An analysis of this type seems to fit well with certain analyses by Paula Chakravartty 
and Dan Schiller on the development of “digital neoliberal capitalism,” which relate the politi-
cal hegemony of neoliberalism directly to the specific transformations that public communica-
tion has undergone with the development of new media networks, but also to the main forms 
and consequences of economic globalization.  The authors maintain that neoliberal politics, 
favoring the massive private investments that have made it possible to develop the new means 
of communication, have also allowed for a vast process of privatization of the global media 
space.  This compromises the fate of ‘true speech’ as it regards the exercise of political and 
economic power.  Here Chakravartty and Schiller insist on the connection between the expan-
sion of digital networks and increasing depoliticization of journalistic information, highlight-
ing in particular the general “inadequacy” of contemporary economic journalism.  In their 
opinion, journalism is not willing to investigate the social costs of global capitalism or the 
causes and possible democratic solutions to the recurring crises seriously.61  
To sum up, both types of analysis point out the urgent need to uphold truths different 
from those compatible with the neoliberal forms of political government and economic power, 
but, at the same time, they urge us not to relax in the easy belief that the current development 
of the media is in itself the condition of greatest freedom for elaborating and speaking this 
truth.  On the basis of these analyses, rather, it can be said that neoliberal government practic-
es have now developed well beyond the traditional sphere of institutional politics through the 
growing influence that the media have over the ethos of the individual through the 
depoliticization of information, the ever increasing promotion of consumption of goods, the 
involvement of people’s very existence in the digital circuits of financial capitalism, etc.62 
                                                 
60 See Toby Miller, Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitanism, Consumerism, and Television in a Neoliberal Age (Phila-
delphia: Temple UP, 2007).  Above all insisting on the greater emancipatory potential of the new media, as 
compared to television, analyses with the opposite viewpoint are proposed by Vincenzo Susca & Derrick De 
Kerckhove in Transpolitica: Nuovi rapporti di potere e di sapere (Milano: Apogeo, 2008).  For a more balanced 
position, see also Antonio Tursi, Politica 2.0 - Blog, Facebook, Wikileaks: Ripensare la sfera pubblica (Milano: 
Mimesis 2011). 
61 Cfr. Paula Chakravartty & Dan Schiller, “Neoliberal Newspeak and Digital Capitalism in Crisis,” Interna-
tional Journal of Communication, no. 4 (2010), 670-692.  For a highly useful analysis of the grave social and po-
litical consequences of the development of ‘digital capitalism’ also see Carlo Formenti, Felici e sfruttati: 
Capitalismo digitale ed eclissi del lavoro (Milano: Egea, 2011). 
62 On processes of ‘financializing the existence’ of contemporary man, see: Randy Martin, Financialization  of 
daily life (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2002); Christian Marazzi, “Il corpo del valore: Bioeconomia e 
finanziarizzazione della vita,” in Adalgiso Amendola, Laura Bazzicalupo, Federico Chicchi & Antonio Tucci 
(eds.), Biopolitica, bioeconomia e processi di soggettivazione (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2008), 135-142; Christian 
Marazzi, Finanza bruciata (Lugano: Edizioni Casagrande, 2009). 
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Clearly, all of this cannot but seriously influence contemporary man’s willingness to question 
the various forms of power, as well as his capacity to free himself from the order of economic 
discourse. 
 
8. An Open Problem  
These issues, as previously mentioned, deserve to be further examined in a separate study.  
However, it can certainly be said that analyses like those of Miller, Chakravartty and Schiller 
reinforce doubts about the possibility that philosophical parrêsia could, in today’s world, easily 
find the right conditions for its regeneration.  However, on this point, it can be considered that 
a general historical reason for the probable ‘crisis’ in the use of ‘true speech’ lies in the pro-
gressive decline of the idea of freedom as a civic virtue which, although problematically, rep-
resented an ideal reference point, which was still alive and essential to philosophical parrêsia in 
its classical form. 
Perhaps it is even difficult to assert that it was truly revitalized by the protagonists of 
the critical ontology of the present which—according to Foucault—Kant ushered in with his 
questioning of the Enlightenment, creating a certain type of philosophy that ranges “de Hegel 
à l’École de Francfort, en passant par Nietzsche, Max Weber, etc.”63  How many of the repre-
sentatives of this philosophy were truly able to avoid the ‘scholastic’ or ‘university’ drift of 
modern philosophical practice and the hegemony of the ‘economic’ and ‘productive’ vision of 
freedom? In the course held shortly before his death, Foucault seemed to raise some doubts 
about the ability of modern philosophy to practice “la forme d’existence comme scandale vi-
vante de la vérité.”64  Not by chance, adopting cynicism as an example of that kind of experi-
ence, he thought he would be able to trace its renewed and more or less significant forms 
through western history, not so much in philosophy, as much as in Christian asceticism, in 
revolutionary militancy, and in modern art.65  
Naturally, it can be said that Nietzsche was better able to avoid the various inclinations 
to conformity of modern philosophy than others.  Perhaps in this sense some passages can be 
read—words never spoken by Foucault in his lessons—from the manuscript of his last course: 
in these passages he proposed an interpretation of nihilism, not as the destiny of western civili-
zation, but as a philosophical combination of cynicism and skepticism which, starting in the 
19th century, poses to the West the very issue of the relationship between “will to truth” and 
“style of existence,” combining the cynical commitment to bear witness to truth in life with the 
skeptical bent to call into question every principle or truth considered to be indisputable.  A 
hypothesis to be verified, even according to Foucault who, in any case, did not shirk from 
asking himself a question as elementary as: ˝comment le cynisme, qui semble avoir été un 
mouvement populaire dans l’Antiquité assez répandu, est il devenu aux XIXe et XXe siècles 
une attitude à la fois élitiste et marginale [?]˝66   
                                                 
63 “from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, via Nietzsche, Max Weber, etc.” (Foucault, Le gouvernement de soi et 
des autres, 22) 
64 “the form of existence as living scandal of truth.” (Foucault, Le courage de la vérité, 166) 
65 See Ibid., 166-174. 
66 “how has cynicism, which seems to have been a widespread popular movement in antiquity, become in 
the 19th and 20th centuries an elite and marginal stance[?]” (Ibid., 175) 
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This question may seem ‘banal,’ but only if, in place of the frankness of parrêsia, one 
prefers the self-importance of snobbery. 
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